Summary. In this paper a procedure is described that computes for a given bimatrix game all stable sets in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Further the procedure is refined to find the strictly perfect equilibria (if any) of such a game.
Introduction
History. An n-person (noncooperative) game is a game in which each player has to choose one of his (finite number of) pure strategies without any prior knowledge of what the other players are going to do. Given the choices of all players each player receives a payoff. The players are also allowed to mix over pure strategies, i.e. to use probability distributions over pure strategies to determine their respective choices. Payoffs are then determined as expected payoffs with respect to the mixtures employed by the players. Nash (1950) showed that such games always have at least one equilibrium.
Since then it has become clear that this notion of Nash equilibrium is not the final answer to the problem of solving games. It is for instance well known that a Nash equilibrium may use weakly dominated strategies (a strategy is called weakly dominated if there is another strategy that does at least as good as this strategy against any combination of strategies of the opponents and strictly better
Correspondence to: M. Jansen against at least one). This observation, along with some other points of critique 1 , triggered a whole series of papers presenting different types of selection criteria for Nash equilibria. Generally speaking the idea was to find a solution concept 2 that weeded out the "bad" Nash equilibria.
(Although there is also a line of literature that tries to weaken the equilibrium conditions these notions usually address the coordination problem involved in equilibrium selection. The Nash conditions themselves are hardly ever questioned.)
Basically we can distinguish two lines of research within equilibrium selection theory. The first form of selection is known as refinement theory. Examples are perfect equilibrium by Selten (1975) , proper equilibrium by Myerson (1978) and strictly perfect equilibrium by Okada (1981) . These refinements were all designed in order to mend a newly discovered flaw of either the original notion of Nash equilibrium or of one of its previously defined refinements. The second stream of literature is commonly known as the theory of stable sets. Its most renowned exponents are defined in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) , Mertens (1989 Mertens ( , 1991 and Hillas (1990) . This line of research started with the seminal paper of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) . They argued that the theory of refinements lacked a fundamental basis. As we already said, most refinements were meant as patching-up jobs for known solution concepts. Kohlberg and Mertens took a different approach. They started with a list of desiderata that were in their view essential for any decent solution concept. Only then they started to search for solution concepts that actually satisfied the desiderata. This quest more or less ended with the papers of Mertens (1989 Mertens ( , 1991 in which he presented a definition of stable sets that he argued to be essentially the right concept.
Computation. For several reasons it is desirable to have an algorithm that computes a given notion of equilibrium selection. First of all an algorithm shows that the notion is more than a theoretical tool. An algorithm unambiguously shows that it is always possible (at least within the domain considered) to actually compute the equilibrium for the given game. Besides that an algorithm can be implemented on a computer, which gives us the opportunity to analyze fairly large and complicated examples.
There is extensive literature on the computation of Nash equilibrium and its selections. Algorithms for the computation of Nash equilibria of bimatrix games can for example be found in Lemke and Howson (1964) , Winkels (1979) and Krohn et al. (1991) . These algorithms are implementable and exact 3 . A general n-person version of the Lemke-Howson approach is described in Rosenmüller (1971) . This procedure is not directly implementable though. Implementable algorithms (based on path-following algorithms for roots of homotopies) for the
